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Torts-ATRACTIvE NUISANCE IN FLORIDA: AN UNATTRACTIVE NuI-
SANCE-Johnson v. Bathey, 376 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1979).
Raymond Johnson, a nine-year-old boy, and his twelve-year-old
brother were walking across land owned by Douglas Bathey which
had been leased and farmed by Naples Limitee, Incorporated. The
two boys were on the unfenced and unposted land to collect sur-
plus vegetables at Limitee's packing house. The record supported
the finding that Limitee allowed children to come to the packing
house to pick up vegetables which were too small for packing. But
according to the lower court, by choosing to take a shortcut across
Limitee's fields, the boys had entered the premises as simple tres-
passers.' While walking across the fields, Raymond was attracted
to a noisy water pump near the path the boys were taking. The
water pump consisted of an engine, the pump itself, and an uncov-
ered rotating shaft twelve to sixteen inches long, connected by two
universal joints. Only the two children were present, and there
were no signs, fences, or safety devices on or near the water pump.
As Raymond moved closer to investigate, his shirt became caught
in the two exposed universal joints. His arm was pulled into the
mechanism, causing severe injury.2 Through his mother, Raymond
Johnson brought an action to recover for his injuries on the
grounds that the pump was an attractive nuisance and that the
defendants were negligent in its operation.8
The circuit court entered a summary judgment for the defen-
dants and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, certifying
that its decision was of great public interest.' The Florida Supreme
Court granted plaintiff's petition for certiorari and held that a
plaintiff may not recover on an attractive nuisance theory unless
he was "allured" onto the premises. Since the water pump did not
allure the plaintiff onto the premises he was precluded from recov-
ery.5 This note examines the appropriateness of this ruling.
In Florida, the general rule as to the duty of care owed by prop-
erty owners to an adult trespasser is only to avoid willful and wan-
ton harm to him.6 This limited duty rule, however, created harsh
1. Johnson v. Bathey, 350 So. 2d 545, 546-47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 376 So.
2d 848 (Fla. 1979).
2. Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, Johnson v. Bathey, 376 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1979).
3. Johnson v. Bathey, 350 So. 2d 545, 545-46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 376 So.
2d 848 (Fla. 1979),
4. Johnson v. Bathey, 376 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla. 1979).
5. Id.
6. Johnson v. Williams, 192 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (citing 23 FLA. Jum.
Negligence § 24 (1959)). The court mistakenly cited to § 24. The rule the court reiterates is
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results when applied to children, so courts developed the attractive
nuisance doctrine as an exception to the rule of limited liability to
trespassers. Reasons for this exception for children have been well
articulated by Professor Prosser, who stated:
When the trespasser is a child, one important reason for the
general rule of non-liability may be lacking. Because of his imma-
turity and want of judgment, the child may be incapable of un-
derstanding and appreciating all of the possible dangers which he
may encounter in trespassing, or of making his own intelligent
decisions as to the chances he will take. While it is true that his
parents or guardians are charged with the duty of looking out for
him, it is obviously neither customary nor practicable for them to
follow him around with a keeper, or chain him to the bedpost. If
he is to be protected at all, the person who can do it with the
least inconvenience is the one upon whose land he strays ...
The interest in unrestricted freedom to make use of the land may
be required, within reasonable limits, to give way to the greater
social interest in the safety of the child ... .
The special rule for children first appeared in 1874 in the case of
Railroad Co. v. StoutO where a trespassing child, injured while
playing on an unlocked railroad turntable, was allowed recovery.
The "turntable doctrine," as it came to be called, required a land-
owner who had reason to believe that children would be attracted
by a dangerous object or situation on his land to use ordinary care
to protect them from injury.10 Eventually the doctrine acquired the
name "attractive nuisance.""
In the 1921 case of United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt,'2 the
United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine was only ap-
plicable where the children were attracted onto the land by the
very object or condition that injured them. In Britt, two young
boys had trespassed onto United Zinc's property; they died after
swimming in a clear pool of water containing sulfuric acid and zinc
actually found at 23 FLA. JUR. Negligence § 54 (1959).
7. Crutchfield v. Adams, 152 So. 2d 808, 812 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
8. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 59 (4th ed. 1971).
9. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 665 (1873).
10. See Railroad Co., 84 U.S. at 659, 661.
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 59 (4th ed. 1971). "'Nuisance' be-
cause of a supposed analogy to conditions dangerous to children in the highway or otherwise
outside the premises; 'attractive' because it was thought essential that the child be allured
onto the premises." Id. at n.37.
12. 258 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1922).
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sulphate.'8 The Court, per Justice Holmes, held that since "there
[was] no evidence that [the pool of poisoned water] led them to
enter the land," the doctrine of attractive nuisance did not apply."
In 1940, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in
Eastburn v. Levin' that the United States Supreme Court had
overruled Britt in Best v. District of Columbia's and had estab-
lished that "the visible attraction need not be the immediate cause
of injury."
Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also rejected
the requirement of allurement and replaced it with a foreseeability
test. Under the Restatement view a landowner is liable for harm
caused to unsuspecting children by a dangerous artificial condition
upon the land if the landowner had reason to know that the condi-
tion created a risk of serious harm and failed "to exercise reason-
able care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the
children.' '1 7
To determine whether the landowner exercised reasonable care,
the Restatement provides for a balancing of the severity of the
13. Id. at 274.
14. Id. at 276.
15. 113 F.2d 176, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940). For a complete treatment of attractive nuisance
law as applied to machinery, see Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 898 (1958).
16. 291 U.S. 411 (1934). Best cited Britt with approval but the decision is inconsistent
with Britt. In Britt, Justice Holmes noted that in order to hold a landowner liable for inju-
ries to trespassing children, the dangerous object must be "shown to have been the induce-
ment that led the children to trespass [or be] shown to have been the indirect inducement
because known to the children to be frequented by others." 258 U.S. at 276. In Best, Chief
Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that a landowner could be held liable
for the injuries to children trespassing on a dangerously-maintained wharf when the chil-
dren were induced to trespass not by the wharf but by nearby sandpiles. 291 U.S. at 419-20.
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToTS § 339(e) (1965). The entire section reads as follows:
Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows
or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize
the risk involved in intermeddling with it or incoming within the area made dan-
gerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved,
and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
Id. § 339.
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risks to the child trespassers against the utility of the activity and
the burden to the landowner of providing protection through pre-
cautionary measures."8 If the landowner has reason to foresee the
presence of children and there is a high risk of harm by some arti-
ficial condition, the landowner must exercise reasonable care. 19 The
Restatement position gives precise form to the original spirit of the
attractive nuisance doctrine. By recognizing the social value of pro-
tecting children and by endorsing an exception to the policy of al-
lowing property owners' free use of their land, the law imposes a
degree of risk upon the very fact of ownership or possession.
The issue left unresolved by the district court of appeal in John-
son v. Bathey2 0 and confronted by the Supreme Court of Florida
was whether Florida would follow the Restatement of Torts or the
prior Florida Supreme Court case of Concrete Construction, Inc. v.
Petterson2' decided in 1968. The specific issue was whether Florida
should dispense with the requirement of "allurement. ' 2 The Re-
statement does not require allurement, but the decision in Con-
crete Construction does.23
In Concrete Construction, a child trespassing on a construction
site found .22 caliber cartridges used for driving screws into con-
crete walls. The child was injured when one of the cartridges he
took home exploded. " The Florida Supreme Court held that the
defendant construction company was not liable to the child.25 The
court stated that since it first approved the attractive nuisance
18. Id. § 339(d).
19. Id. § 339(a), (b) & (e).
20. 350 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 376 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1979).
21. 216 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1968).
22. 376 So. 2d at 849.
23. 216 So. 2d at 223. In the four-to-three decision of Concrete Construction, the dis-
senting opinion pointed out that the defendant in that case clearly knew or had reason to
know that there was an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to children from the dan-
gerous condition. The dissent added, "[there is] no real disparity between the statement of
this rule from Sec. 339, Rest. Torts, and the expressions in our cases applying the doctrine
of attractive nuisance." Id. The fundamental requirement is the allegation that the "defen-
dant had reason to know children would come onto the premises as trespassers," and the
dissenting judges felt that the doctrine of attractive nuisance "is simply a label better de-
fined by the Restatement rule." Id. at 223.
In Johnson, the district court acknowledged that pursuant to the decision in Concrete
°Construction, the definition of attractive nuisance set out by the Restatement was not the
law of Florida. 350 So. 2d at 548. The court stated, "We are obligated to follow the pro-
nouncements of our Supreme Court, even though at times we might disagree . Yet, we
are convinced that Section 339 of the Restatement of Torts states the better rule." Id. at
548.
24. 216 So. 2d at 222.
25. Id. at 223.
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doctrine in 1925 in Stark v. Holtzclaw,2 6 "[W]e have steadfastly
held that it must be alleged that [the] defendant allured the
youthful plaintiff upon the dangerous premises . . . .", The Flor-
ida Supreme Court in the one-page Johnson opinion accepted this
position rather than the Restatement view. 8
The supreme court, however, could have easily adopted the Re-
statement view consistently with its prior decisions. Section 339 of
the Restatement of Torts was quoted extensively with approval by
the supreme court in the 1955 decision of Cockerham v. R.E.
Vaughan, Inc.'s The Cockerham court cited the Restatement and
the 1954 case of Carter v. Livesay Window, Inc.8 0 as the rule of
liability in attractive nuisance cases.8 1 In Carter, the Florida Su-
preme Court en banc reversed the summary judgment of the dis-
trict court, holding that "[tihe test to be applied . . . is whether a
reasonably prudent person should have anticipated the presence of
children" where the defendant created the dangerous situation.2
In these early Florida attractive nuisance cases the courts followed
the Restatement position by applying a negligence standard. As
the Second District Court of Appeal held in the 1961 case of Banks
v. Mason,"" the doctrine of section 339 "is well established in the
jurisprudence of this state. 8 4 The First District Court of Appeal in
the 1963 case of Crutchfield v. Adams8 also cited section 339 of
the Restatement as the correct rule of law in attractive nuisance
cases.8 The Crutchfield case was similar to Johnson in that the
plaintiff was allegedly attracted to and injured by an exposed elec-
tric water pump after he entered the property to play with the
landowner's child. The landowner was alleged to know that chil-
dren had been on the premises in the past; his failure to take pre-
cautionary measures was advertent.37 The district court held that
it was error for the lower court to dismiss the complaint, even
though it was not alleged that the plaintiff had been "allured" onto
26. 105 So. 330 (Fla. 1925). Stark is apparently the first Florida case to recognize the
attractive nuisance concept.
27. 216 So. 2d at 223.
28. 376 So. 2d at 849.
29. 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955).
30. 73 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1954).
31. 82 So. 2d at 892.
32. 73 So. 2d at 413.
33. 132 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
34. Id. at 220.
35. 152 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
36. Id. at 810.
37. Id. at 809.
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the premises."8
The case which most strongly suggests that Johnson should have
adopted the Restatement view is the prior Florida Supreme Court
case of Green Springs, Inc. v. Calvera.89 In Green Springs, a
homeowner and builder of a housing project were sued for negli-
gence when a nine-year-old girl died after a planter on the side of
one of the houses fell upon her.'0 In discussing the attractive nui-
sance doctrine, which was held to be inapplicable because the child
was not a trespasser, the court stated:
Perhaps the phrase "attractive nuisance" has become an unat-
tractive nuisance. There never was a time when f nuisance, in the
old equity sense, was required in an "attractive nuisance" case.
And the idea of attraction has led sound courts, including this
one, [citing Concrete Construction] into nearly evenly split deci-
sions which may distract lawyers from the fundamentals on which
the duty of care toward one's fellow man depends.' 1
The court then went on to state:
What we are dealing with when we speak of "attractive nuisance"
is merely a set of circumstances relating to the innocence of dhn-
ger on a child's part, the likelihood of trespass and consequent
danger and the foreseeability of this chain of circumstance on the
part of one who would not owe as great a duty of care toward an
adult trespasser. All of these factors are to be considered in the
light of the utility of maintaining the dangerous condition and
the cost of eliminating the danger. All of these may combine to
impose upon the landowner or possessor or, as in Carter v. Live-
say Window Company, the person responsible for the dangerous
condition of the land, a duty of care. All of this specification of
principle is adequately covered by Restatement Torts 2d, § 339,
and by a voluminous literature."
Amazingly, the Johnson court failed even to mention the Green
Springs decision.
The Florida Supreme Court also failed to analyze decisions in
other jurisdictions which have adopted the Restatement position.
38. Id. at 813.
39. 239 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1970).
40. Id. at 265.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 266 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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In Anderson v. Cahill's the Missouri Supreme Court noted that
the requirement of enticement and allurement of the trespassing
child by the dangerous object or condition had been eliminated
when the Restatement of Torts' foreseeability test had been
adopted as the law of Missouri. In McFall v. Shelly," the New
Mexico Supreme Court stated, "[We have generally accepted the
doctrine as set out in Section 339 of the Restatement of Torts."
The court noted that it followed the majority rule "which does not
require that the child be actually attracted to the premises by the
artificial condition itself.' '14 Pennsylvania has also held that the
Restatement of Torts provided the proper rule regarding the at-
tractive nuisance question."
Other states have modified the allurement requirement by con-
sidering it an element for determining the foreseeability of a
child's trespass. The Illinois case of Geiger v. Fisher47 adopted this
position by holding that "the element of attraction is significant
only insofar as it bears on the foreseeability of children." Texas
has also followed this position as exemplified by the case of Eaton
v. R.B. George Investments, Inc."' The supreme court of that state
said that liability would exist if the conditions of section 339 of the
Restatement of Torts were satisfied.49
California and New York have gone the furthest in protecting
the child plaintiff by adhering to a single standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances whereby foreseeability becomes the
sole theoretical measure of liability. Both have also abolished the
distinction between licensees, invitees, and trespassers, applying
instead a single standard of care. The prominent cases are the New
York case of Basso v. Miller" and the California case of Rowland
v. Christian.51
The opportunity for Florida to follow this trend and to reconcile
the inconsistencies of its past law came before the Florida Supreme
43. 485 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo. 1972).
44. 374 P.2d 141, 143 (N.M. 1962).
45. Id. (citing Selby v. Tolbert, 249 P.2d 498 (N.M. 1952)).
46. Bartleson v. Glen Arden Coal Co., 64 A.2d 846, 849-50 (Pa. 1949).
47. 244 N.E.2d 848, 851 (111. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See also Kahn v. James Burton Co.,
126 N.E.2d 836, 842 (Il. 1955).
48. 260 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. 1953).
49. Id. at 590. See also Massie v. Copeland, 233 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1950).
50. 40 N.Y.2d 233 (1976). See 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 426 (1969).
51. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). Other cases involving the abolishment of these categories
include Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v: City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d
445 (Hawaii 1969).
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Court in Johnson. The court elected to follow a standard of liabil-
ity which is contrary to the spirit of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine and the public policy of protecting innocent children.
In Johnson, children were known to frequent the defendants'
fields.5 2 Plaintiff argued, to no avail, that an owner or occupier of
property who knows that children will enter onto the premises
should be under a special duty of care to protect them from being
injured by any "hidden" nuisances which may be dangerous." By
allowing the landowner and occupier to escape liability because the
plaintiff was not allured onto the premises, the Johnson doctrine
could have disastrous consequences.
The Florida Supreme Court in Johnson overlooked the basic
purpose of the attractive nuisance doctrine. Because of a child's
immaturity and lack of judgment, he is incapable of understanding
and appreciating all possible dangers he might encounter while on
another's property. The interests of the landowner in unrestricted
use of his property must yield to the greater social interest in pro-
tecting children. The landowner must assume some of the respon-
sibility for a child's presence on the premises when the child's
presence is foreseeable. He should be required to employ reasona-
ble care when maintaining artificial conditions if the danger might
not be appreciated by children. The doctrine of attractive nuisance
is simply one of reasonable care when considered in its broadest
terms. The Supreme Court of Florida has construed it narrowly by
requiring allurement of the child onto the premises by the danger-
ous object or condition, making the doctrine of attractive nuisance
in Florida truly an unattractive nuisance.
ROBERT SANTOS
52. Johnson, 350 So. 2d at 547. The Second District Court of Appeal in this case found
that "it]here is ample evidence in the record below to reflect that children were permitted
to come to the packing house to pick up culls. Furthermore, the farm management knew
that children sometimes went into the fields because they had run them out on previous
occasions." Id.
53. Brief of Petitioner at 20-21, Johnson v. Bathey, 376 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1979).
